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ABSTRACT 
Many applications, including provenance and some analyses of 
social networks, require path-based queries over graph-
structured data. When these graphs contain sensitive 
information, paths may be broken, resulting in uninformative 
query results. This paper presents innovative techniques that 
give users more informative graph query results; the techniques 
leverage a common industry practice of providing what we call 
surrogates: alternate, less sensitive versions of nodes and edges 
releasable to a broader community. We describe techniques for 
interposing surrogate nodes and edges to protect sensitive graph 
components, while maximizing graph connectivity and giving 
users as much information as possible. In this work, we 
formalize the problem of creating a protected account G' of a 
graph G. We provide a utility measure to compare the 
informativeness of alternate protected accounts and an opacity 
measure for protected accounts, which indicates the likelihood 
that an attacker can recreate the topology of the original graph 
from the protected account. We provide an algorithm to create a 
maximally useful protected account of a sensitive graph, and 
show through evaluation with the PLUS prototype that using 
surrogates and protected accounts adds value for the user, with 
no significant impact on the time required to generate results for 
graph queries. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many graph-structured data sets contain sensitive information 
(e.g., a “secret source” in a provenance graph, a “member of 
gang x” relationship in a social network, or certain connections 
among computers or other entities in a network). Prior work has 
emphasized manipulations of the whole graph in order to permit 
analysis while still protecting node identity [1] or sensitive 
relationships [15]. Techniques include adding and removing 
edges based on knowledge of certain nodes’ degree [10] or their 
neighborhood [16],  sampling from a model of the network 
structure [9], and grouping entities into classes and masking the 
mapping  between  entities  and  corresponding  nodes  [5]. Such  
 
whole graph manipulations are appropriate when mining the 
graph for interesting patterns and trends.  
However, there exist applications in which 1) only particular 
nodes, node properties, or relationship instances are sensitive, 
and 2) important queries traverse paths from specified starting 
places. For instance, in a provenance1 graph, the input-to 
relationship is sensitive only in specific cases and not 
generically; the most common queries traverse paths from given 
starting points (“what data and processes contributed to this 
data?”).  
Figure 1 contains an abstract graph with some sensitive data 
instances (1a) and a partially ordered set of privilege classes 
(1b). (The shading in 1a indicates the minimum privilege 
required to access the node.) For our running discussions, we 
will interpret this graph as a social network. However, it could 
also be a provenance graph in which some data or edges are 
sensitive. (See Appendix Figure 11 for an extended provenance 
example similar to the abstract graph and roles in Figure 1.) It 
could also be a computer network in which the company owning 
the network may make connections among some nodes visible 
to anyone, while others are shared only with a newly acquired 
company (‘High-1” privileges) or business partners (“High-2”).  
Using Figure 1 as a social network, in which nodes c and g 
represent individuals connected by the sensitive node f, 
representing involvement with a particular gang, a user may be 
willing to share that c and g know each other as long as the 
participation in the gang is hidden. However, there is currently 
no way to let a user with “High-2” privileges know that c and g 
are related.  
Standard access controls require that only the information in 
Figure 1c be accessible to a user with “High-2” privileges. 
Unfortunately, for a path traversal query, if one ancestor node is 
too sensitive to access, one cannot return any of its 
predecessors—e.g., a “High-2” user seeking the predecessors of 
node g would learn nothing of b or c, despite the fact that they 
contain no sensitive information. It is not uncommon for the 
hiding of just a few nodes to cause most of a path to become 
inaccessible.  
Our proposed solution leverages existing common practice; real-
world data providers often create alternate, less sensitive 
versions of information that are releasable to different 
                                                                
1 “provenance of objects…is represented by an annotated 
causality graph, which is a directed acyclic graph, enriched with 
annotations capturing further information pertaining to 
execution.” [11]  
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consumers. In the rest of this paper, we interpret Figure 1a as a 
social network used in a criminal investigation. It is possible 
that certain information (“court-sanctioned surveillance by an 
agent of Agency X”) should only be revealed to highly trusted 
partners, say those with “High-2” privileges, while the larger set 
of “Low-2” partners would still get value from less detailed 
information (“a trusted law enforcement source”). We call such 
less sensitive versions surrogates. This paper describes 
techniques for interposing surrogate nodes and edges as needed 
to protect sensitive graph components, while maximizing graph 
connectivity and giving users as much information as possible. 
This paper makes the following contributions: 
• We formalize the problem of creating a protected 
account  of a graph , which does not include the 
sensitive information from  while preserving as much 
connectivity as possible.  
• We define a utility measure for protected accounts which 
allows comparisons of the informativeness of alternate 
protected accounts. 
• We define an opacity measure for protected accounts, 
which indicates the likelihood that an attacker can 
recreate the topology of the original graph from the 
protected account. 
• We present an algorithm for creating a maximally useful 
protected account from a graph with surrogates.  
• We show, through evaluation with the PLUS prototype 
software [4], that using surrogates and protected 
accounts adds value for the user, with no significant 
impact on the time required to generate results for graph 
queries. 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
A graph  consists of a set of nodes, , and a set  of directed 
edges between pairs of those nodes. (We model bi-directional 
edges as two directed edges.) Nodes have features, such as 
timestamp, author, etc., modeled as attribute-value pairs. A 
graph object is a node or edge appearing in that graph. 
The provider of a graph object decides which information 
details may be released to consumers with specific privileges, 
e.g. “High-2”. A provider can control the release of specific 
node features and, independently, control which incident edges a 
consumer may see [12]. For example, the social network may 
show two individuals as being business partners, but not reveal 
that one of them is the brother of a gang leader. We assume the 
existence of a Boolean function ℎ	
(, ), for a 
consumer c and graph object o; this is evaluated by the 
cognizant authority for the object, using all context information 
(time, location, role, etc). It is out of the scope of this paper to 
explore ways in which consumer credentials are generated, 
passed, and authenticated. 
To characterize which objects may be released to a particular 
consumer, we define privilege-predicates, Boolean functions 
over consumer credentials. A privilege-predicate p defines a 
class of consumers: 
Definition 1. For a consumer c, a privilege-predicate p, 
and a graph object o, if p(c) ⇒ authorized(c, o), we say o is 
visible via p. 
For ease of reading this paper, we use a nickname for a 
particular privilege-predicate; in Fig. 1, for example, “High-1” 
refers to a specific privilege-predicate.  
Privilege-predicates are partially ordered.  
Definition 2. A privilege-predicate  dominates another 
privilege-predicate  if ∀ consumers c,	() ⇒ (). Note 
that a privilege-predicate trivially dominates itself. 
Definition 3. A lowest predicate for an object o, (), is a privilege-predicate  such that o is visible via p, 
and for all privilege-predicates , if o is visible via , then ′ 
dominates p. 
A set of incomparable privilege-predicates is one in which none 
dominates another. In this paper, we assume that there is a 
“Public” privilege-predicate dominated by all other privilege-
predicates. 
3. NODE AND EDGE SURROGATES 
Our goal is to provide each consumer with the most informative 
protected account possible, subject to the principle that it is 
more important to protect than inform.  
3.1 Surrogate Nodes 
Nodes in a graph may not be releasable to certain consumers, 
but there may be versions of these nodes releasable to other, less 
privileged, groups of consumers. These alternate versions, or 
surrogate nodes, protect sensitive information by omitting or 
changing features of the original node (e.g., using “illegal 
substance” instead of “heroin”) for consumers lacking access to 
the original node: If n’ is a surrogate for a node n, then 
lowest(n’) does not dominate lowest(n). (Note that this 
requirement allows lowest(n’) to be incomparable with 
lowest(n).) 
The node provider is responsible for generating appropriate 
surrogates and identifying the lowest privilege for each 
surrogate, although there is no requirement that surrogates be 
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Figure 1: (a) Sample Graph, . This generic graph is used to 
illustrate provenance, social networking and computer 
networking examples in the introduction. It is also the basis 
for a running social network example throughout the rest of 
the paper. Nodes in graphs are shaded to reflect the lowest 
set of access privileges required. (b) Sample set of user 
privileges; each nickname (“High-1”, etc.) summarizes a 
predicate expressing privileges. (c)  , a naïvely protected 
account of 1(a) available to a user with “High-2” privileges. 
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provided for every node. We define a <null> surrogate node 
with no features; <null> can be used as a default surrogate.  
Definition 4. A node n’ corresponds to a node n iff either 
all of the features of n’ are the same as those of n (written 
n’ = n) or n’ is defined as a surrogate for n). 
Definition 5. Given a graph G = (N, E), a protected 
account of G is a graph G’ = (N’, E’) where each node n’ ∈  N’ 
corresponds to a unique node n ∈ N and for every path between 
two nodes in G’ there is a path in G between the corresponding 
nodes. 
Thus, in Figure 1, each node in  , the naïvely protected 
account, is the same as a single node in , and all paths in   are 
also present in .  
For this work, perhaps the most fundamental characterization of 
a graph is the set of privilege-predicates needed to see all nodes. 
We define a high-water set, HW, that is the set of lowest 
privileges required to see all objects within a graph. In Figure 
2a, the high-water set is {“High-1”, “High-2”}. To see this 
complete graph, a consumer’s credentials would have to satisfy 
a predicate dominating the conjunction of the members of the 
high-water set.  
Definition 6. The high-water set, , of a graph  = (,) is the set of privilege-predicates {,  … } such 
that  
1. No member of HW dominates another, 
2. For every node n ∈ N, there is some p ∈ 	HW such that p 
dominates lowest(n), and 
3. For every	p ∈ 	HW, there is some node n ∈ N such that p =  
lowest(n). 
While high-water sets are descriptive, they also provide a target 
when generating protected accounts. We would like to find a 
protected account whose high-water set comes as close as 
possible to the consumer’s privileges while remaining 
dominated by them. If the consumer’s privileges are identical to 
the lowest necessary for a given account, then that account 
contains nodes at the dominant levels allowable. Original nodes 
that are dominated by the consumer’s privilege will appear in 
the protected account; original nodes which are not dominated 
by the protected account’s high-water predicate will be omitted 
or represented by surrogate nodes (including the default <null>, 
if necessary) in the protected account. 
3.2 Edges in Protected Accounts  
Producers must be allowed to do more than just provide node 
surrogates. Relationships among nodes may also be sensitive, so 
edges in a protected account are also governed by providers’ 
release policies. For instance, in the social network example, it 
is desirable to show the relationship between c and g, but omit 
the information that the path goes through a political cause. 
We allow providers to mark all edges connected to a node (in 
practice, these may be defined on sets of nodes, e.g., all edges 
from data nodes of certain types, or all outgoing edges). 
Providers of information represented by each of the source and 
destination nodes may mark an edge. Markings at each end of an 
edge need not agree; this preserves local autonomy in the 
definition of release policies. Because each edge is subject to 
marking by at least the providers of the source and destination 
nodes, the final disposition of the edge in the protected account 
depends on the combination of markings.  
Definition 7. For a graph G and a privilege-predicate p, 
each node-edge incidence has a marking, 
mark(n,e,p)∈{Visible, Hide, Surrogate}.  
A Visible marking means that the provider is willing to show 
this node-edge incidence to consumers satisfying p. Hide means 
it may not be shown, nor may it be used to compute any edge in 
the protected account. A Surrogate marking means that the 
node-edge incidence may be used to maintain a path in a 
protected account, although the incidence cannot be shown 
directly. The Surrogate marking is a way to hide the role of a 
node while maintaining some of the connectivity of the original 
graph.  
Surrogate edges in a protected account G’ summarize paths in 
the original graph (e.g., an edge between c and g) that are visible 
via HWG’.  
Definition 8. Given a high-water set HWG’, and an 
original graph G, an HW-permitted path between nodes n1 and 
n2 in G is one in which:  
1. There are no edge-incidences marked Hide for any p 
dominating a member of HWG’ and in which the n1 and n2 edge-
incidences are marked Visible for some p dominated by a 
member of HWG’, and  
2. If there is a corresponding edge between n1 and n2 in G, then 
each node-edge incidence is marked Visible for some p 
dominated by a member of HW. 
So, given the edge markings in Figure 2a, c-f-g is an HW-
permitted path. Figure 2b shows a protected account with the 
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Figure 2: Protected accounts with high-water set {“High-2”} based on Figure 1; relevant edge markings for “High-2” are 
shown in the dotted boxes for each graph. Assume all other edge markings are Visible. (a) Protected account with 
surrogate node f’ and visible edges. (b) Protected account with hidden node f and surrogate edge c-g. (c) Protected account 
with surrogate node f’ and hidden edges. (d) Protected account with surrogate node f’ and same surrogate edge as graph 
in (b). 
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surrogate edge c-g; showing a relationship without divulging 
information about the political cause. 
4. UTILITY AND OPACITY MEASURES 
This paper focuses on transforming a graph  into a protected 
account , such that  preserves as much of the information in , its utility, as possible, while protecting against attacks by 
malicious (or overly curious) users who try to use  to infer 
protected information in , i.e., preserving the protected 
account’s opacity.  
4.1 Utility 
Our goal is to generate protected accounts that convey more 
information than naïvely protected accounts. Connectedness is 
one measure of the information content of the graph, as captured 
in the Path Utility Measure below. Since we wish to support 
graph queries over paths, e.g. connections to or from specific 
nodes, we measure the percentage of paths retained in   to and 
from each node. For each node  ∊ , the path percentage, 
%(), is the number of nodes in  connected (by any length 
path) to , divided by the number of nodes in  that are 
connected to . Recall from our definition of a protected 
account that  corresponds to a subset of N.  
The Path Utility Measure, Figure 3a, computes the average 
percentage of paths in  that are retained in . Note that if a 
node  in  has no corresponding node  in , then it 
contributes 0 to the average. 
The nodes in , in Figure 1a, which are not visible via “High-2” 
are protected by simply hiding the sensitive nodes and their 
incident edges, yielding the protected account  , in Figure 1b. 
In  , the node b’ (shown in the figure simply as b, since b’ = b) is only connected to one other node in  , while b was 
connected to 10 nodes in . So, %(b’) = 1/10, while 
%P(h’) = 3/10. Each of the nodes hidden in   contributes 0 to 
the Path Utility Measure. The Path Utility Measure for   is .13, 
as shown in Figure 3b.  The Path Utility Measures for the graphs 
in Figure 2 are: (a) .38; (b) .27; (c) .13, the same as for Figure 
1c, since the surrogate f’ introduces no new paths; (d) .27, the 
same as for Figure 2a. 
But, graph topology is not enough. At the extreme, if you had 
<null> nodes everywhere, there would be no information in the 
graph; therefore, we also need some measure of how much of 
the potential node information is available. This is the Node 
Utility measure. Node utility is more difficult to assess. Suppose 
that our social network graph  contained a node with the 
features <phone, “123-456-7890”> and <name, “Joe”>. A 
surrogate node with the single feature <name, “Joe”> has a 
lower node utility value than the original node: each node in  is 
considered maximally useful. Nodes in a protected account are 
compared to the corresponding original nodes to determine their 
utility.  
The value function infoScore(n’), with a range from 0 to 1, 
reflects the closeness of a node in  to the corresponding node 
in , and can depend on completeness, semantic analysis, etc. 
So, when n’ = n, infoScore(n’) = 1. While in general the 
burden would be too great for administrators to manually assign 
infoScores to all surrogate nodes, we can use defaults or 
manually assign scores for critically important nodes. The Node 
Utility Measure, Figure 3c computes the average utility of nodes 
in  as compared to their corresponding nodes in .  
Because the nodes in   were created from  using an all-or-
nothing approach, each node n’ in   has an infoScore of 1, and 
the Node Utility Measure of   is 6/11. (Note that the all-or-
nothing approach will always yield a Node Utility Measure of 
||/||.) In this paper, we also assume that surrogates visible  
via more restrictive privilege-predicates are more informative. 
Therefore, the infoScores of surrogates defined for the same 
node are partially ordered: if n’ and n” are both surrogates for n, 
and lowest(n’) dominates lowest(n”) then 
infoScore(n’) ≥ infoScore(n”).  
Node and edge surrogate strategies are intertwined. While it 
may seem that there is a negligible information gain in including 
a null surrogate, for example, that node may still play an 
important part in improving the connectivity of the protected 
account. Conversely, there may be no reason to provide a 
surrogate for a privilege predicate if none of its incident edges 
are preserved for that predicate. The Node Utility and Path 
Utility Measures together help evaluate the utility gains and 
losses for competing surrogate strategies. 
4.2 Opacity 
A protected account  is created to satisfy the release policies, 
so no unauthorized node or edge information is directly revealed 
to an attacker. However, G’ may allow an attacker to infer 
information in  from . In other words, the attacker’s goal is 
to determine the topology of the underlying graph, G, given .  
A naïve attacker would have no knowledge of the general 
properties of a graph. Thus, if a naïve attacker is given a 
disconnected graph, as shown in Figure 1c, the lack of 
knowledge of the properties of a graph may not awaken any 
suspicion that the graph has been redacted in any way. On the 
other hand, an advanced adversary could have fundamental 
knowledge of the properties of a graph. While an attacker may 
be able to infer hidden graph information using background 
domain knowledge of the node’s contents, such knowledge is 
extremely difficult to model and is outside the scope of this 
paper. Rather we focus on the topology of the graph, and on the 
attacker’s ability to recreate the edges.  
Because we wish to protect the protected account from the most 
advanced attacker, we assume that the attacker has the 
additional background information: 
• Whether or not the complete graph information is 
represented in , 
• The transformations available to the administrator for 
transforming  into . 
ℎ				 = 	∑ %()||  															 
	 
( ) = .13  										 = 	∑ () ||  
  (a)    (b)    (c)    
Figure 3: Utility Measures 
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Using this information, the attacker has a powerful method for 
determining if the graph presented in the account has been 
altered. We ignore graph-motif recognition, the possibility that 
an attacker will be able to recognize sub-graph shapes as 
corresponding to a particular task. This information is related to 
an attacker’s background knowledge of the graph contents and 
is outside the scope of this work. 
Opacity measures the difficulty an attacker is likely to face in 
inferring the existence of an edge in G that is not present in G’. 
Greater opacity means that an attacker is less likely to infer the 
existence of the hidden edge. Figure 4 shows the formula for the 
opacity of an edge e = (n1 → n2) in G. The main calculation, , 
relies on two factors: FP, the probability that an attacker will 
focus on the specific nodes	  or	  in a protected account, and ( , →	 ), the likelihood that an attacker focusing on  	will infer the edge →	 .  
For instance, in Figure 1c, because the graph is disconnected 
and the attacker is advanced, the attacker may focus on the 
nodes b’ and c’ as likely nodes with missing edges. There may, 
of course, be many false positives, but the ability of an attacker 
to rule these out relies on domain knowledge; for example, in 
provenance graphs, an attacker knows there aren’t any cycles. 
Background knowledge and expectations determine values for 
FP. As an example, suppose there is a strong expectation for a 
strongly connected graph (as would be the case for many 
provenance queries). As shown in Figure 5 an attacker would be 
more likely to focus on “loner” nodes, say those connected to at 
most one other node. Similarly, given that focus, an attacker 
would be more likely to infer an edge to a node with few edges. 
Given these sample constants, the table in Table 1 compares 
path utility and opacity measures for the graphs in Figure 2. 
Opacity of edge (f→g) is 0 for the graph in 2a because the edge 
is present; it is 1 for 2b because the graph does not include a 
node corresponding to f. Note that when “loner” nodes are likely 
to draw an attacker’s attention, adding surrogate edges to a 
protected account increase both path utility and opacity (as in 
graphs 2c and 2d). 
The opacity metric is useful in two ways. First, opacity allows 
an administrator to look at specific nodes and incident edges that 
are of high security concern and to evaluate the risk of 
inference. Second, the average opacity over the entire graph can 
be used to evaluate tradeoffs.  
5. TRANSFORMATIONS WITH 
SURROGATES 
The utility and opacity measures give us a way to compare 
protected accounts. In general, the goal is to produce a protected 
account with as much utility as possible, while making sure that 
the opacity is still tolerable for the application. 
In order to maximize the utility measures, a protected account 
must: show the original nodes from G whenever possible; 
include surrogate nodes with the most dominant privilege-
predicate available within the high-water set (this is a proxy 
requirement for choosing the surrogate with the maximal 
infoScore); and reflect as many HW-permitted paths as 
possible. 
Definition 9. Let G’, with high-water set HWG’, be a 
protected account of G. G’ is maximally informative w.r.t. G iff it 
satisfies three properties:   
1. maximal node visibility: For all nodes n in G, if ∃p ∈ HWG’ 
such that n is visible via p, then G’ includes the corresponding 
node n’ = n.  
2. dominant surrogacy: Let n be a node in G that is not visible 
via any p ∈ HWG’. If G’ contains a corresponding node n’, then 
there is no surrogate n” defined for n such that n” is visible via 
a privilege-predicate in HWG’ and lowest(n”) dominates 
lowest(n’). (Note that if there are incomparable surrogates 
dominated by HWG’, any of them may be chosen for inclusion in 
G’.)  
3. maximal connectivity: Whenever there is an HW-permitted 
path between n1 and n2 in G, and corresponding nodes   and   appear in G’, then there is a path between   and   in G'.  
The strength of dominant surrogacy and maximal connectivity 
depend heavily on the surrogates defined by the provider. When 
surrogate nodes are provided to take the place of original nodes 
that are not visible via the high-water set, they allow the 
inclusion of more surrogate edges, in addition to increasing the 
node utility.  
Lemma 1: Let G’ be a protected account of G, and let M be 
the subset of nodes in G with corresponding nodes in G’. If no 
node n ∈ M has surrogates visible via incomparable privilege-
predicates in HWG’, and G’ satisfies the maximum node visibility 
and dominant surrogacy properties, then no protected account of 
G with the same set M and the same high-water mark will have a 
higher node utility measure. 
	 = 
 0 if	( →  ) ∈ 
1 if either  or   has no
corresponding node in ′
1 − 	 otherwise  
 
 = 	  ∗ 	
 ,(→	 )∑ 	
 ,(→	)  ∗ 	
 ,(→	 )∑ 	
 ,(→	 ) 	   
Figure 4: Opacity Measure 
 FP = !0.8, 0 − 1	connected	nodes0.2, 																										otherwise  = !0.8, degree ≤ 10.2, degree > 1																													 
Figure 5: Sample constants for opacity formula for an 
advanced adversary and an original graph with the 
properties of i. no disconnected subgraphs and ii. average 
degree > 1. 
Table 1: Path Utility and Opacity Measures for graphs in 
Figure 2. 
 (a)  (b)  (c)  (d) 
PathUtility 
(avg) .38 .27 .13 .27 
Opacity 
(f→g)only 
0 1 .882 .948 
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When there is a node in M with two or more incomparable 
surrogates, maximum node visibility and dominant surrogacy 
are sufficient as long as the surrogate with the highest infoScore 
is used in G’. 
Lemma 2: Let G’ be a protected account of G, and let M be 
the subset of nodes in G with corresponding nodes in G’. If G’ is 
maximally connected, then no protected account with the same 
set M and the same high-water mark will have a higher path 
utility measure. 
THEOREM 1. Suppose that the Surrogate Generation 
Algorithm generates the protected account G’ for a graph G, 
high-water mark HWG’, and set of nodes M with corresponding 
nodes in G’.  Then G’ has the highest node and path utility 
measures possible for HWG’  and M .  
The Surrogate Generation Algorithm (see Appendix) is designed 
to produce maximally informative graphs for the given HWG’ 
and M. Therefore, using the lemmas, the resultant graphs have 
the highest possible utility measures. The resultant graph is, of 
course, highly dependent on the high-water marks of the original 
and protected accounts, the set of node surrogates available, and 
the policies used to mark node-edge incidences. Different node 
surrogate and edge marking strategies can be compared via the 
utility and opacity measures for resulting protected accounts.  
6. EVALUATION 
The question to be answered: is it possible to adequately protect 
graph information using surrogates while maximizing the 
usefulness of that provenance information? Our experiments 
show surrogates give better opacity and better utility than 
removing graph objects.  
We perform experiments over two very different sets of graphs: 
motifs and synthetic. We begin the evaluation of surrogate 
techniques by studying the effect of surrogates within 
specialized and well-known graph motifs. Each graph in this set 
contains only four to five nodes. The nodes are arranged into 
classic patterns such as tree, diamond, etc. Analysis over these 
graphs gives insight into how the shape of the graph affects 
opacity and utility when surrogating or hiding graph 
information. We then analyze how surrogates affect larger, more 
complex, synthetically generated graphs. Analysis over these 
graphs gives insight into how different methods of protecting 
the graph affect disclosure and utility in more realistic graphs.  
While node surrogating is important, we intentionally leave an 
analysis of node surrogating out of this evaluation. Because 
node surrogating relies on explicit domain knowledge, it is 
dependent on specific situations. Edge surrogating can be 
measured without any assumptions of the attacker’s knowledge. 
The graph transformations were implemented in Java as part of 
the PLUS system [2]. All experiments were performed on a Dell 
Windows XP workstation with Intel Dual Core T7400 each at 
2.16GHz with 2GB RAM.  
6.1 Datasets and Experimental Setup 
6.1.1 Motifs 
We created graphs containing 4-5 nodes and representing classic 
motifs; these motifs included: star, chain, lattice, diamond, tree, 
inverted tree and bipartite. Figure 6 contains a representation of 
all of the motifs utilized. Each motif was used as an initial 
directed graph, with the first edge protected in each graph, 
shown as a dashed line.  
6.1.2 Synthetic Graphs 
While analysis of graph motifs gives insight into the effects of 
hiding or surrogating edges, typical graphs contain many 
different motifs. Because these motifs may overlap and interplay 
differently depending on the links between them, it is important 
to look at protection in larger graphs. We generated 50 synthetic 
graphs of 200 nodes each. Across the 50 synthetic graphs, the 
connectedness increases such that on average every node has 30 
to 100 connected pairs; and the protection is varied from 10%-
90% of all edges. In other words, for the set of 10 graphs that 
have 10% of the edges protected, the connected pairs vary from 
30 to 100. Additionally, the graphs all contain no disconnected 
subgraphs and have directed edges 
6.2 Motif Graph Analysis 
Figure 7 shows the change in opacity and utility for all of the 
motif graphs. Compared to just omitting the information, 
surrogating raises opacity and utility for all motifs except 
Bipartite and Lattice. An analysis of these two graphs shows 
why there is no difference between hiding and surrogating. 
Star Diamond
Chain
Tree Inverted Tree Bipartite
Lattice
Figure 6: The Classic Graph Structures used as Motifs. The 
dashed edge indicates the one chosen to protect. 
Figure 7: The difference between surrogating and hiding 
edges for Utility and Opacity for all motif graphs, e.g. 
OpacitySurrogate - OpacityHide. 
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Because the bipartite graph is only two levels deep, the edge that 
is to be protected cannot be surrogated: there are no nodes in 
deeper levels that can act as the destination of a surrogate edge, 
so surrogating in this case produces the same result as hiding. 
The Lattice graph shows no difference in Utility and Opacity for 
a different reason. In this case, it is possible to draw a surrogate 
edge. However, the presence or absence of this edge does not 
change the utility since the node remains connected to the same 
set of nodes through other paths. Additionally, the opacity does 
not change the absence of the edge, in protection by hiding, does 
not change the Focus Probability (FP), since the degree remains 
greater than one. 
Our experiments show that surrogates can actually increase 
opacity, making it harder for an adversary. This is because edges 
summarizing paths are created, lowering the suspicion of a node 
without edges . 
6.3 Synthetic Graph Analysis 
Figure 9 shows the difference in opacity between surrogating vs. 
hiding edges in larger synthetic graphs. We use the graph notion 
of connected pairs to measure how interconnected or sparse a 
graph is. The amount of the graph protected has the greatest 
influence on how much better surrogating is than hiding. Figure 
9a shows the difference in Opacity. The more surrogates used 
for protection, the greater the opacity. Meanwhile, Figure 9b 
shows that the utility goes down based on the amount of graph 
that is protected. The key takeaway, however, is that all of the 
values in Figure 9 are positive; surrogating is always better than 
hiding for protection. 
Figure 8 shows the tradeoff between opacity and utility for the 
hiding vs. surrogating decisions. Even if an administrator wishes 
to protect the graph and ensure a particular opacity, it is better to 
use surrogates to maintain a desired opacity while sharing  more 
useful graphs. 
6.4 Performance 
Figure 10 shows the time it takes to create the base account and 
the protected account. The transformation from  to  takes 
~10ms. Hiding takes less time since the overall size of the graph 
is ultimately smaller. Thus, the cost for protecting a graph via 
transformation into a protected account is easily subsumed in 
the cost of creation of the graph itself. 
7. RELATED WORK 
As noted in the Introduction, there is considerable research on 
whole-graph manipulations of social network graphs to protect 
privacy while supporting data analysis [1, 5, 9, 10, 15, 16]. 
There is also substantial research on access controls for 
provenance [3, 4, 8, 12-14]. None of this work addresses the 
problem of uninformative query results for path-traversal 
queries. 
 
Figure 8: Maximum Utility given an Opacity rating, as seen 
in the synthetically generated graphs. 
Figure 9: The difference between surrogating and hiding edges for Utility and Opacity for all synthetic graphs, e.g. 
OpacitySurrogate - OpacityHide. The graphs show how Utility and Opacity change with hiding and surrogating based on how 
connected a graph is, and how much of it is protected. 
Figure 10: The time it takes to produce a graph and 
transform it into a protected account. 
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[7] uses views to hide details of how modules are connected in a 
workflow. Also, subsetting approaches such as Oracle Label 
Security automatically define a view that does not access the 
sensitive information, while predefined views allow for arbitrary 
surrogates. These view-based approaches suffer the major 
disadvantages of: manual view definition for all views 
(requiring detailed knowledge of a subgraph and all its potential 
user classes), and view recomputation when object sensitivity 
changes. In contrast, surrogates and protected accounts allow 
owners of particular nodes to locally specify their security 
concerns and have the appropriate views constructed 
automatically. On the other hand, techniques such as [6] can be 
used in parallel with surrogates, by using the Secure-View to 
suggest appropriate modules and attributes to hide. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
In this work, we describe the need to protect graph information 
beyond complete node or edge anonymization. We show that 
there are graphs in which only certain nodes and edges must 
also be protected, and that a binary “show/hide” approach is not 
generally useful. To this end, we introduce the notion of 
surrogates that can protect the underlying graph information by 
providing less detailed node and edge information. Moreover, 
we describe metrics to measure how much an attacker may be 
able to learn about the underlying graph based on the protected 
account generated. We also introduce a measure for the 
usefulness of the protected account with respect to the original 
graph. Through experiments on small classic graphs, and large 
synthetic graphs, we show that our surrogating approach 
generally provides better utility and opacity than the 
“show/hide” approach.  
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APPENDIX 
A: Provenance Example 
To prepare for a disease outbreak, an emergency treatment plan 
is produced via the set of processes described in Figure 11a, 
with arrows indicating flow over time. The shading of each node 
indicates the lowest of the privilege classes defined in Figure 
11b required to access the node. Arrows in Figure 11b indicate a 
“dominates” relationship, e.g., Cleared Emergency Responder 
(CER) dominates Emergency Responder (ER), meaning that all 
users with CER privileges can access all nodes marked with ER. 
A user with ER privileges can see the Emergency Treatment 
Plan, but not information on the Local Action Planning process 
or the Emergency Supplies Stockpiles data which fed it. In prior 
provenance systems, that same ER user could not learn anything 
about the provenance of the Emergency Treatment Plan, even 
though she has sufficient privileges to access many of the 
contributing nodes if only she knew they existed. 
B: Producing Protected Accounts  
Algorithms 1-3 in Figure 12 contain pseudocode for generating 
maximally informative protected accounts. For simplicity, the 
algorithm shown here considers protected accounts with 
singleton high-water sets; when there are multiple privilege-
predicates, the same process is used for each predicate until an 
appropriate surrogate is found. When surrogates are available 
for incomparable privilege-predicates, we assume there is a 
domain-dependent function to choose which surrogate is 
included in the protected account.) 
 We start with an original graph, G = (N, E), where bi-
directional edges are modeled as two directional edges, and the 
algorithm produces a protected account G’ = (N’, E’) such that 
HWG’ = {p} and p is dominated by some member of HWG. This 
protected account can be used to evaluate queries by consumers 
satisfying p. Whenever a node in G is visible via p, that node is 
included in N’ (upholding the maximal node visibility property), 
otherwise the visible surrogate with the highest info-score is 
used. The edge markings are used to determine E’. In Algorithm 
2, every edge (n1, n2) ∈ E which is marked Visible at privilege p 
by both n1 and n2 is preserved in E’. Edges marked Hidden by 
either the source or destination node are excluded from E’. Other 
edges, i.e., those with no Hide markings, and with at lowest 
one Surrogate marking, are used to compute surrogate edges in 
accordance with the maximal connectivity property. In 
particular, E’ includes an edge from   to   iff:  
1. (n1, n2) has no Hide marking for p  (i.e., if E included (n1, 
n2), then we don’t want to show any computed edges between 
them either); the rest of the conditions allow for replacing paths 
with surrogate edges  
2. there is an HWG’-permitted path from n1 to n2 in G, and  
3. there is no shorter HWG’-permitted path from n1 to n2 in G  
(redundant surrogate edges would not violate any correctness 
criteria, but they make the graph less clear; also note that paths 
consisting only of edges marked Visible will not yield surrogate 
edges because each preserved edge is shorter than the path, and 
these are already included in E’) 
This algorithm runs in O(n2d) where n is the number of nodes in 
the graph, d is the degree of the nodes. Every node will be 
touched once to determine a surrogate. However, when 
determining the surrogate edges, the worst case is when all 
edges are marked Surrogate. In this case, every node will look 
forwards and backwards through its edges attempting to find a 
visible node to make an edge with, thus possibly touching n 
nodes in a fully connected graph. 
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Figure 11 Example of a provenance graph to be protected, similar to the generic graph found in Figure 1. 
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Figure 12: Surrogate Generation Algorithms 
INVISIBLE  
Algorithm 1: Protected Account Generation 
1: Input: Graph G =(N, E).  
2: Input: Privilege-predicate p.  
3: Output: Protected Account G’ =(N’, E’).  
4: for Nodes n ∈ N do  
5:  if p dominates lowest(n) then  
6:   N’.add(n)  
7:  else  
8:   N’.add(most-dominant-surrogate(p,n))  
9:  end if  
10: end for  
11: Set potentialEdges = markEdges(G, p)  
12: for Edges <n1, n2> ∈ potentialEdges do  
13:  if marking = Visible then  
14:   E’.add(<n1, n2>)  
15:  else  
16:   Node backwards; Node forwards;  
17:   if edge-mark(p, n1) = Visible & edge--mark(p,n2) = Surrogate then  
18:    backwards=n2; forwards=n1;  
19:   else if edge-mark(p, n1) = Surrogate & edge-mark(p,n2) = Visible then  
20:    backwards=n2; forwards=n2;  
21:   else if edge-mark(p, n1) = Surrogate & edge-mark(p,n2) = Surrogate then  
22:    backwards=n1; forwards=n2;  
23:   end if  
24:   Set backset = buildVisibleSet(backwards, potentialEdges, backwards)  
25:   Set forwardset= buildVisibleSet(forwards, potentialEdges, forwards)  
26:   for Node pairs (f, b), f ∈ forwardset, b ∈ backset do  
27:    N’.add(<f,b>);  
28:   end for  
29:  end if  
30: end for 
 
Algorithm 3: MarkEdges 
1: Input: Graph G =(N, E).  
2: Input: Privilege Predicate p.  
3: Output: Set potentialEdges  
4: for Edges <n1, n2>  ∈ E do  
5:  if edge-mark(p, n1) = Visible & edge-mark(p,n2) = Visible then  
6:   potentialEdges.add([<n1, n2>, Visible]);  
7:  else if not edge-mark(p, n1) = Hide & not edge-mark(p,n2) = Hide then  
8:   potentialEdges.add([<n1, n2>, Surrogate]);  
9:  end if  
10: end for  
11: return potentialEdges 
Algorithm 2: Build Visible Set. 
1: Input: Node n  
2: Input Privilege Predicate p. 
3: Output: Set reachableNodes  
4: for Edges <n, n1> ∈ E do   
5:  if edge-mark(p, n1) = VISIBLE then  
6:  : reachableNodes.add(other)  
7:  else reachableNodes.add(BuildVisibleSet(,n1, p))  
8:  end if  
9: end for  
10: return reachableNodes  
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